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Book reviews 
Eugene Fontinell, Self, God, and Immortality: A Jamesian Investigation. 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986. XVII and 297 pages. $34,95. 
William James's commentary on religion contains a persistent tension 
between the attractions of humanism and theism. His twin impulses 
express an unease in modernist culture between the call to be engaged in 
this world and the attractions of religious belief. The question of immor- 
tality is perhaps the most problematic issue on this front because it is so 
baldly other-wordly: to anyone even moderately swayed by the call of 
human reason and moral action, immortality belief seems implausible or 
even plainly irrelevant. At this impasse, with potential religious believers 
attracted to religious faith but repulsed by one of its major features, 
Eugene Fontinell's God, Self, and Immortality offers welcome, sane, and 
judicious commentary and insights. He draws on the work of James and 
other pragmatists and phenomenologists to investigate the possibility for 
an immortality belief in the modem cultural context. 
Just as James sought to mediate science and religion at the beginning of 
the modernist era, Fontinell seeks a middle ground which like humanism 
avoids the escapism of traditional beliefs in immortality, yet like these, 
recognizes the deep satisfactions and comfort that come with expectation 
of life beyond this veil of tears and unfulfilled hopes. This is a tall order 
indeed. 
While his challenge is difficult, Fontinell brings to the task a scholar's 
understanding of pragmatic philosophy and a range of philosophies of 
immortality and also a creative philosopher's insights on this elusive and 
pressing religious question. The book is, consequently, in two parts. Part 
One is an able and erudite explication of James's philosophy and psychol- 
ogy. It is scholarship with an immediate purpose: in this portion of the 
essay, Fontinell mines James's thought for useful and innovative theories 
to support the possibility of immortality belief for the modem mind. In 
Part Two, he asserts his own James-inspired belief in immortality. In the 
spirit of William James, Fontinell's philosophy is a tentative inquiry, 
plausible and full of confidence, yet open throughout to opposing points of 
view. 
Fontinell's inquiry leans heavily on James because his pragmatic and 
pluralistic outlooks provide a starting point for immortality belief which is 
both unorthodox and well suited to the modem temper. The most impor- 
tant Jamesian text for his purposes is one that has only begun to receive 
attention in the last thirty years, thanks to the pioneering work of John 
McDermott and other philosophers who have increasingly taken James's 
work seriously despite its informal style. In unpublished psychology 
lectures prepared in 1895-1896, James used the metaphor of "fields" to 
describe our experience of reality. Within our field of attention, some 
things are tightly in focus, while others hover at the fringe. Reality as a 
whole, then, is a complex set of relations among fields between in- 
dividuals; the individual self is itself a nexus of overlapping fields. 
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According to the field perspective, boundaries between experiences are 
not distinct, but rather they are "shifting, overlapping, fusing, and separat- 
ing" (p. 40). James was not alone in developing this perspective, as 
Fontinell readily acknowledges: John Dewey maintained that objects are 
never experienced in isolation, but only in "situation;" the contemporary 
phenomenologist Richard Stevens talks of our experience of reality in 
"sensible totals." 
The field perspective has important implications as a way of understand- 
ing James's psychology, his pragmatism, his radical empiricism, and his 
pluralism; but Fontinell is, of course, most interested in using it to support 
the plausibility of immortality belief. A psychology of fields is an alterna- 
tive to the dualism that has been the traditional basis for belief in immor- 
tality. The field perspective denies that immortality is a totally distinct, 
other-wordly phenomena, but rather allows for it to be viewed as a field 
within human experience, although in varying degrees and generally far 
on the fringes of ordinary attention. Fontinell agrees with James that the 
divine world is in a field of experience near to us, yet generally inacces- 
sible. James explains with a helpful and amusing metaphor: "a super- 
human life" which creates and sustains us, hovers near, "as dogs and cats 
are in our libraries, seeing and hearing the conversation, but having no 
inkling of the meaning of it at all." Religious experience, rituals, prayers, 
and especially mystical relations occasionally allow us to make contact 
with the other world, but for the most part it remains a field of experience 
that is near but elusive. 
James's field approach allows for the interaction of psychology and 
religion in a way that is relevant to Fontinell's immortality belief. Because 
there is no definite boundary between a field's center and its periphery, the 
arena of human psychology merges into the mysteries of religion. Personal 
consciousness and identity lie at the center of an individual's field of 
attention, while around it lie fields of lesser intensity, ranging from the 
margins of perceptual awareness to the vaguely felt, metaphysical and 
religious "sense of more" ringing its edges. With James providing a 
modern map of our psychological and religious worlds, Fontinell charts a 
path toward the plausibility of immortality belief for the contemporary 
seeker. 
Fontinell's hope for life after death based on field psychology does not 
come with proof, but it does allow for confirmation through experience to 
the extent that we can touch on the margins of our consciousness. His 
belief is not designed to debunk transcendental claims, but to point out 
their potential accessibility; moreover, he presents immortality belief as 
not an escape from this world, but as an enhancement of current life, to the 
degree that we can penetrate and comprehend our spiritual margins. 
Fontinell's philosophy of immortality is, therefore, a marriage of theism 
and humanism: God reigns powerfully and eternally in a field away from, 
but not discontinuous with, our consciousness, but the divine is finite and 
growing, demanding our human instructions. 
Fontinell's rich and clearly written account of immortality belief from 
the pragmatic perspective is most suited to an audience of serious scholars 
and philosophers. His essay is useful to students of William James because 
it highlights his field psychology and explains its relevance to other, more 
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famous, works. Anyone interested in the relation of pragmatism to religion 
or in process theology, whether for or against, should also take up this 
volume because it provides a creative set of images and ideas which are 
useeful to an understanding of how these outlooks work in religious belief. 
Undergraduates will find this book tough going, but graduate students will 
appreciate its arguments and its helpful summary of pragmatic religion. 
By making a brave attempt to understand immortality in light of modem 
perspectives, Fontinell redeems immortality belief from its traditional 
associations with death, by regarding it as a question of life. 
Paul Jerome Croce 
Stetson University 
Deland, FL 32720 
Graham Parkes (Ed.), Heidegger and Asian Thought. Honolulu: Univer- 
sity of Hawaii Press, 1987. 282 pages. $25.00. 
Despite the appearance of a certain compatibility between Heidegger's 
thought and Eastern philosophy the latter was not an important source for 
Heidegger. It remained, for the most part, only something which intrigued 
him but which he never got around to studying in earnest - we have only 
an aborted attempt at translating the book of Lao Tzu, in collaboration 
with Paul Shih-yi Hsiao in 1946, as evidence of his ever trying to come to 
grips with an Oriental philosophical text. Nevertheless, the systematic 
relationships of Heidegger's thinking to Oriental philosophy are well 
worth investigating. With this volume we have serious attempts to do so 
by an interesting collection of scholars, many of whom have already 
distinguished themselves in the field of Heidegger studies. One may feel 
that the results are incomplete - so many aspects of both Oriental 
philosophy and Heidegger's writings remain to be explored from this 
angle - but the anthology represents an important contribution to the 
comparative study of Heidegger and the field of comparative philosophy 
in general. 
After an introduction by Parkes, J.L. Mehta, in an essay titled 
"Heidegger and Vedanta: Reflections on a Questionable Theme," explains 
why Heidegger "lacked Schopenhauerian warmth for Indian philosophy." 
In seeking a different way of comprehending Being than that launched by 
the Greeks, i.e., metaphysics, Heidegger sought not so much an alternative 
as a more foundational way of thinking. Sensing that the Greeks had 
barely missed it, he felt that one ought to return to the problems with 
which they were originally occupied and rethink them rather than inves- 
tigating other, more exotic points of view that might not address the issue 
of Being as he conceived it at all. Faithful to Heidegger's concern not to 
perpetuate our ingrained habits of thinking about Being, Mehta advises 
restraint in comparing his philosophy to Advaita Ved~.nta. One should not 
just look for common philosophemes defined in terms of standard 
metaphysical and epistemological categories, but rather heed Heidegger's 
call to think the unthought depth of any tradition. 
The editor Graham Parkes' essay, "Thoughts on the Way: Being and 
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Time via Lao-Chuang," is perhaps the best study of the volume. It makes 
significant headway in interpreting a text of Heidegger and exhibits 
impressive mastery both of Heidegger's thought and an Asian 
philosophical tradition. Parkes takes up various concepts of Being and 
Time (readiness-to-hand, anxiety, nothingness, death, nature) which 
appear at first sight to be handled in quite un-Taoist fashion (e.g., the 
emphasis on Vorhandenheit as the horizon for the being of things in the 
world would seem to reflect a utilitarian attitude toward man and nature) 
and shows, with considerable ingenuity, that they conceal themes that 
come out in Heidegger's later writings, which are recognizably Taoist in 
spirit. 
Other fine essays by Otto Prggeler, Joan Stambaugh, and Michael 
Levin have been included, but the volume is especially valuable for its 
contributions from various Chinese and Japanese scholars, smoothly 
translated into English. There is a reprinted essay by the important 
contemporary Japanese philosopher, much influenced by Heidegger, Keiji 
Nishitani, in which he discusses two lectures of Heidegger's in light of 
Zen Buddhism. Yasuo Yuasa in "The Encounter of Modem Japanese 
Philosophy with Heidegger" discusses the influence of Heidegger on the 
thought of Kiyoshi Miki and Tetsuro Watsuji. His article is, more 
generally, valuable for its summary of the history of the dominant Kyoto 
School of Japanese academic philosophy. Along with Paul Shih-yi Hsiao's 
account of his collaboration with Heidegger on the Lao Tzu translation, 
there are other original, interpretive studies by Akihiro Takeichi, Kohei 
Mizogushi, Tetsuaki Kotoh, and Hwa Yol Jung ("Heidegger's Way with 
Sinitic Thinking"). Of these, the article by Kotoh, "Language and Silence: 
Self-Inquiry in Heidegger and Zen," stands beside that of Parkes in its 
skillful use of the comparative method to illumine aspects of Heidegger's 
thought that might otherwise have been missed. 
John A. Taber 
Department of Philosophy 
University of New Mexico 
Albuquerque, NM 87131 
Peter Winch, Trying to Make Sense. Oxford and New York: Basil Black- 
well, Ltd., 1987.213 pages. 
This book consists of eight essays (some of them revised) first published 
between 1976 and 1982, along with five previously unpublished essays. 
They cover a variety of topics, but are tied together by the author's 
acknowledgement that "anything I have had to say about any of these 
topics is grounded in such understanding as I have of Wittgenstein's 
philosophy" (p. 1). 
Several of the essays are largely about the exposition and interpretation 
of passages in Wittgenstein's writings. I will say no more about them here. 
Two of the essays deal with relativism. They are perhaps the most 
interesting in the book, in part because Winch has sometimes been 
severely criticized as being himself a relativist in some pejorative sense. In 
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these essays, however, he rejects the views most commonly associated 
with that position. In "Ethical Relativism" he gives the clearest short 
argument I know of against the suggestion that we should replace the 
notion of truth simpliciter with something like truth-for-me, truth-for-you, 
etc. (p. 182). And in the same article he argues, persuasively, it seems to 
me, that the absence of cross-cultural ethical principles, in any of several 
senses which that phrase might bear, does not entail any duty to accept the 
legitimacy of the actions or principles of other cultures, to be "tolerant" of 
them, to refrain from making moral judgments about them, or any such 
thing (pp. 191-193). 
The ethical relativism which Winch does accept seems to consist, in 
this article anyway, in the realization that two people of good will might 
understand each other and yet continue to hold moral views which conflict 
with each other (pp. 188, 189). 
In "Language, Belief and Relativism" Winch rejects any suggestion that 
we should eliminate the distinction between what is the case and what is 
merely thought to be the case (p. 194). He is not, at any rate, a relativist of 
that sort. But he does think that there are deep difficulties in understanding 
just what it is that a person in a radically different culture believes. 
Consequently, it is difficult to determine how much incompatibility there 
is between our beliefs and those of such a person. 
The difficulty, as I understand it, consists principally of the problem of 
understanding what the "aliens" mean by their utterances. Of course, no 
human culture is completely alien to others; there is much that we share. 
But some practices - Azande "witchcraft," for example, and the consulta- 
tion of oracles - have no live analogues in our culture. There is, therefore, 
no reason to suppose that English already has a way of expressing what 
the Azande mean when they describe what they are doing as they "consult 
the poison oracle." The anthropologist, says Winch, "has to learn not 
merely how the Azande express what they are doing when they consult the 
oracle, but what they are doing, what it is to consult the poison oracle." (p. 
198) The discussion of this problem is suggestive, but not at all easy to 
follow. 
Three of the essays seem to belong to the philosophy of religion - 
"Meaning and Religious Language," "Darwin, Genesis, and Contradic- 
tion," and "Who Is My Neighbour?". 
In "Meaning .... " Winch is primarily concerned with how a religious 
use of language is to be identified. There are some interesting suggestions 
about the identification of a religious practice, and then the remainder of 
the article deals with the relation of religious language to the overall 
practice of religion. Much of it, it seems to me, is concerned with claiming 
that religious language is much different from "ordinary" uses of lan- 
guage, and it should not be understood in the same way. 
To take one example, Winch says "I want to argue that there is a 
difference in grammar between 'asking something of God' and 'asking 
something of the Yugoslav ambassador'" (p. 119). "The point of prayer," 
he adds, "can only be elucidated to (sic) considering it in its religious 
context; ... it cannot be elucidated by starting simply with the function 
'making requests to x,' substituting 'God' for 'x,' and then asking what 
difference is made by the fact that God has different characteristics from 
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other xs." As a matter of fact, however, Winch does not argue this thesis, 
or so at least it seems to me. He merely reiterates it in terms of various 
special cases and applications, such as the role of belief in the existence of 
the addressee. 
I have the impression that the discussion suffers (curiously, for a 
Wittgensteinian) from beginning with too simplistic a notion of what is 
involved in the practice of making requests of the Yugoslav ambassador. 
Of course, we are likely to think first that the point of making such a 
request must be to obtain the thing requested. And then it is easy to notice 
that there is a lot of prayer which does not have that point. But in fact 
there can be many different "points" in making requests of the Yugoslav 
ambassador. One can make such a request to annoy the ambassador, or to 
call attention to one's desperate plight, or to generate a publicity 
"happening," or to strike up an acquaintance with the ambassador, or ... 
And for many of these "points," obtaining the thing requested is of little 
importance, or maybe of none at all. 
The term, "prayer," covers a complex array of actions, attitudes, 
intentions, etc., and probably there is no single "point" which belongs 
equally to all of them. Some genuine and proper prayer does indeed seek 
the thing which is requested. (I know that this is sometimes denied. The 
people who deny it seem to me to be much more spiritually minded than 
was Jesus.) Much prayer does not. (Much of it, in fact, is not couched in 
the grammar of requests at all. But so too is it a fact that much communica- 
tion with the Yugoslav ambassador does not consist of making requests of 
him.) If we are to assess the extent to which prayer, or some other 
religious practice, is analogous to some "ordinary" practice, then we must 
be sensitive to the complexities on both sides of the comparison. 
"Darwin ..." suggests that the conflict between the darwinian and the 
biblical account of origins may not be a logical incompatibility, but rather 
a "conflict in oneself, where what is important is to clarify the nature of 
one's commitments" (p. 138). "Who ... " uses Jesus' parable of the good 
Samaritan as a device for examining certain questions in moral 
philosophy, such as those raised by Elizabeth Anscombe in her 1958 
article, "Modem Moral Philosophy." 
All in all, this is an interesting and provocative collection covering a 
fairly wide variety of topics. 
George I. Mavrodes 
Department of Philosophy 
The University of Michigan 
Ann Arbor, MI 48109 
